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Background
The Local Government Code or LGC (Republic
Act 7160) of 1991 and the Organic Act for
Muslim Mindanao (Republic Act 6734) of
19891 jointly define central-local relations in
the Philippines. Both pieces of legislation
include provisions that increased the share of
local government units (LGUs) in central
government revenues, broadened LGU taxing
authorities, and devolved to LGUs functions
that used to be assigned to central govern-
ment agencies.
As is the case in other countries, there is a
mismatch between the revenue-raising
capacities and expenditure needs of various
levels of local government in the Philippines
(Table 1). Many types of taxes are either
easier to administer at the central level or are
deemed to be unsuitable for local subnational
government imposition because their tax
bases are geographically mobile. On the other
hand, the principle of subsidiarity implies
that many functions are best assigned to
local governments. In this context, intergov-
ernmental transfers are generally viewed as
an instrument that may be used to correct for
the imbalance in the tax and expenditure
assignment.
In the Philippines, intergovernmental trans-
fers or central government transfers to LGUs
are of three types: formula-based block grants
(i.e., internal revenue allotment or IRA),
origin-based share in central government
revenues (i.e., share in national wealth and
other taxes), and ad hoc categorical grants.
In principle, LGUs have almost full discretion
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in the utilization of their IRA. In contrast,
the categorical grants are conditioned on
their use for specific purposes.
This Policy Notes focuses on the IRA and looks
into some issues and challenges regarding its
design.
Issues in design of the IRA
Under the Local Government Code, the aggre-
gate IRA of LGUs is set at 40 percent of the
actual internal revenue tax collections of the
central government three years prior to the
current year.2 The aggregate IRA is then
divided among the different levels of local
government as follows: 23 percent to prov-
inces, 23 percent to cities, 34 percent to
municipalities, and 20 percent to barangays.3
In turn, the IRA share of each tier of local
government is then apportioned to individual
LGUs on the basis of population (50 percent),
land area (25 percent), and equal sharing (25
percent).4 The IRA is transferred as a block
grant and, as such, LGUs enjoy considerable
discretion in its utilization.
Intergovernmental transfers in the Philip-
pines, however, have been criticized for (i)
vertical imbalances leading to the inadequacy
of the IRA to fund the expenditure functions
assigned to them; (ii) lack of an equalizing
feature in the IRA distribution formula so that
disparities in the fiscal capacities of LGUs are
not adequately addressed, thereby widening
the geographic disparities in human develop-
ment outcomes and level of economic devel-
opment; (iii) disincentive effects on local
revenue generation; and (iv) poor predictabil-
ity in the size of the IRA which undermines
the ability of LGUs to effectively plan and
manage their expenditures.
Vertical imbalance
A matching of the aggregate IRA levels with
the expenditure responsibilities of LGUs
Table 1. LGU revenues and expenditures relative
to general government revenues
and expenditures
        Ratio of LGU Ratio of LGU Expenditure
  Revenues to General   to General Government
        Government         Expenditure Net

















2 In comparison, the share of LGUs in national taxes was
equal to 20 percent of internal revenue taxes at the
maximum during the pre-Code regime. The amount of IRA
that was actually appropriated in the pre-Code era was 13
percent of net BIR tax receipts on the average in 1987–
1990.
3 Prior to the implementation of the Code, the inter-tier
allocation of the IRA was: 27 percent to provinces, 22
percent to cities, 41 percent to municipalities, and 10
percent to barangays.
4 In the pre-Code period, the intra-tier allocation to
individual LGUs was determined as follows: 70 percent on
the basis of population, 20 percent based on land area, and
10 percent based on equal sharing.PN 2007-09
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(including devolved functions, additional
mandatory positions, unfunded mandates, and
the budgetary requirement for the 20%
development fund) in 1993, 1994, and 1995
shows that while the concern about the
vertical balance was not justified in the
aggregate in these years, such was not the
case in 1996, 1997, and 1998. During these
latter three years, the salary adjustments
under the Salary Standardization Law were so
hefty that the increases in the IRA were not
able to keep up with the rising cost of
devolved functions, unfunded mandates, and
the increasing pressure for additional expen-
ditures due to population growth (Manasan
2006). On the other hand, a similar analysis
for 1999–2003 indicates that during this
period, the increase in the IRA is more than
sufficient to fully cover the inflation, popula-
tion growth, and salary adjustments in the
cost of devolved functions for all LGUs
combined. This is due to the fact that the
mandated increase in salaries of government
employees in the latter period was moderate
compared to that in the earlier period. It
should be emphasized, however, that the
estimates used in the latter period did not
include the newer mandates given to LGUs in
the interim such as the contributions for the
health insurance premiums of indigent resi-
dents and population management, among
others.
Said analysis is also limited by the fact that
in the computation, the cost of devolved
functions refers only to the cost of personnel
and facilities that were actually transferred to
the LGUs as well as the maintenance and
operating expenses associated with such
devolved facilities. There are cases, however,
where functions were transferred to LGUs
without any corresponding devolution of
personnel and facilities from the central
government. This is true in the case of public
works and, to a large extent, in the area of
environment and natural resource manage-
ment. In this sense, the estimates of the cost
of new LGU expenditure responsibilities used
in this analysis would tend to underestimate
their true cost and, consequently, overesti-
mate the vertical balance for all LGUs in the
aggregate. Moreover, the cost used in the
estimation refers to the cost of the devolved
functions as budgeted by the central govern-
ment prior to devolution. As such, they do not
necessarily reflect local preferences.
Horizontal imbalance
Variations in net resource transfer5 across
levels of local government are substantial. In
the aggregate, the net resource transfer for
cities is consistently larger than those for
provinces and municipalities (Manasan 2006)
as seen in the consistently positive transfer
for cities in 1995–2003 and the negative
transfer for provinces and municipalities in
1995–1999. This analysis suggests that
______________
5 The net resource transfer for any given year is computed
as the difference between the IRA for said year, on the one
hand, and the sum of the adjusted cost of devolved
functions, cost of other mandates including the provision
for the 20 percent Development Fund and sectoral
representation, and the 1992 IRA, on the other hand.
Adjustments on the cost side were made to take into
account population growth and inflation.PN 2007-09
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provinces and municipalities in the aggregate
are relative net losers while cities are relative
net winners from fiscal decentralization.
This situation is more clearly shown in the
following. Provinces absorbed 37.0 percent of
the total cost of devolved functions, munici-
palities, 38.5 percent; cities, 5.7 percent; and
barangays, 18.8 percent .6 When this is
contrasted with the mandated share of LGUs
in the IRA (provinces, 23 percent; cities, 23
percent; municipalities, 34 percent; and
barangays, 20 percent), it becomes immedi-
ately apparent that there is a mismatch in the
resources transferred and the cost of addi-
tional expenditure responsibilities that were
devolved to the different levels of local
government.
In addition to the vertical imbalance across
levels of local government, an imbalance also
exists across LGUs within each level. Thus,
while the increase in the IRA share of some
LGUs is not enough to finance the functions
devolved to them, others have received
additional resources beyond their require-
ments. For instance, in 2001, per capita net
resource transfer was negative in 45 (57%)
out of 79 provinces, 772 (52%) out of 1494
municipalities, and 17 (15%) out of 113 cities
(Manasan 2006).
Lack of equalization
At the same time, when all LGUs are aggre-
gated at the provincial level, their combined
per capita IRA is found to be positively
related to per capita household income in
1995–1999, suggesting that the IRA distribu-
tion formula has been counter-equalizing with
respect to the fiscal capacities of LGUs
(Manasan 2006). In contrast, the IRA was
found to be equalizing in 2000 (as indicated
by the negative correlation coefficient
between per capita IRA and per capita
household income in that year).7 However,
even in 2000, the combined equalizing effect
of the IRA and categorical grants is not
sufficient to compensate for the inherent
disparities in the tax base (as indicated by
the positive correlation coefficient between
the per capita household income and the sum
of the LGUs’ per capita own-source revenue
and per capita IRA aggregated at the provin-
cial level).
Given the wide disparities in the distribution
of the local tax base across regions, this
______________
6 Barangays received P1.5 billion in Barangay Administra-
tion Fund under the National Assistance to Local Govern-
ment Units (NALGU) in 1991. This assistance, which was
used to pay for the salaries of barangay officials, was
discontinued with the implementation of the Local
Government Code and barangays are then expected to pay
said salaries out of their own IRA share.
7 The difference in the sign of the correlation coefficient
between per capita IRA and per capita household income in
the years 1995–1999, on the one hand, and the year 2000,
on the other, suggests that the implementation of the
Local Government Service Equalization Fund (LGSEF) scheme
in 1999–2000 may have resulted in some equalization.
Note that the LGSEF provided additional transfers to lower-
income class LGUs in 1999–2000. The LGSEF transfers were
also treated as part of the IRA in the financial statements
of LGUs.
...While the increase in the IRA share of some LGUs is
not enough to finance the functions devolved to them,




result further highlights the potential for
continuing, if not increased, disparities in
human development outcomes across LGUs
with greater fiscal decentralization unless
part of intergovernmental transfers are
designed to have an equalization role. For
instance, an analysis of division level data for
2005 indicates that a positive and statisti-
cally significant relationship exists between
the elementary level cohort survival rate, on
the one hand, and per capita education
expenditures of LGUs, on the other. In like
manner, an analysis of regional level data for
2003 reveals a positive and statistically
significant relationship between the number
of children given complete immunization and
number of mothers given two doses of tetanus
toxoid vaccine, on the one hand, and LGU
spending on health, on the other.
Disincentive effect of the IRA on revenue
generation
While intergovernmental transfers had a
neutral effect on local revenue
performance in 1985 (prior to the
Code), there is some evidence that
the IRA tended to substitute for local
tax revenues of provinces and cities
in the post-Code period (1992–2000).
The analysis suggests that LGUs
which received higher IRA (whether
in absolute terms or relative to their
expenditure responsibilities) tended
to be lax in their tax effort. Thus,
there appears to be a need to alter
the IRA distribution formula so as to
provide incentives for local tax effort.
Consistent with a priori expectations, the
analysis also shows that per capita local tax
revenue is positively and significantly related
to per capita household income for both real
property tax and local business tax for cities,
municipalities, and provinces alike.  This
finding confirms that local tax effort is
largely determined by the ability to pay.
Predictability and timeliness
in the release of the IRA
Notwithstanding the formula-based determi-
nation of the aggregate IRA share of LGUs
and its distribution to individual LGUs as well
as the LGC provision for the automatic release
of the IRA, the IRA evolved to be a highly
unpredictable revenue source for LGUs be-
tween 1998 and 2004 as the central govern-
ment, faced with severe fiscal constraints,
persistently reduced the amount of intergov-
ernmental transfers to LGUs (Table 2). In
those years, the mandated IRA share was
Table 2. Comparison of IRA appropriations and IRA obligations
(in billion pesos)
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
 
(1) Mandated IRA share:
40% of net BIR revenues
three years backa 81.0 96.8 121.8 131.9 134.4 141.0 143.4
  
(2) Appropriations 81.0 96.8 111.8b 111.8 134.4 141.0 141.0
  
(3) Obligations 76.9 95.3 114.3c 115.8 134.4 141.0 141.0
  
(1) less (3) 4.1 1.5 7.5 16.1 0.0 0.0 2.4
a as indicated by IRA level proposed in the President’s Budget
b P10 billion of the P121.8 billion mandated share was put under “unprogrammed funds” in the GAA
c in the course of the budget year, P2.5 billion was transferred from the “unprogrammed funds”
  to the “programmed” portion of the budgetPN 2007-09
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either not appropriated in full, the amount
appropriated for IRA was not released in full,
the IRA appropriation was not released on
time, or the IRA share was effectively cut due
to the re-enactment of the budget.
After two Supreme Court rulings in 2000 and
then in 2004 upholding the automatic release
of the IRA and its distribution strictly as per
the provision of the LGC, a significant shift in
the treatment of the IRA became evident.
Although the GAA was re-enacted once again
in 2006, a supplemental budget (Republic Act
9358) was passed into law in July 2006
providing for, among other things, additional
IRA to augment the amount that was deemed
re-enacted. Furthermore, Republic Act 9358
stated in very clear terms that the IRA shall
henceforth be automatically appropriated. In
line with this, the aggregate IRA share of all
LGUs is expected to increase by 10 percent
from PhP166 billion in 2006 to PhP183.9
billion in 2007. Subsequently, it will grow by
another 15 percent to PhP210.7 billion in
2008.
At the same time, to further improve transpar-
ency and timeliness in the release of the IRA,
the DBM has instituted the posting of the
LGUs’ IRA shares on the DBM website in
January 2007 and every January thereafter.
Monthly releases of the Notice of Cash Alloca-
tions (NCA) will also be posted along with the
comprehensive allotment release within the
first quarter of every year.
Impact of unpredictability in IRA
and LGU spending.
A review of the trends in the size and compo-
sition of LGU revenues and expenditures in
2001–2005 reveals how economic uncertain-
ties and the fiscal constraints faced by both
the central and local governments have
diminished not only the size of the overall
LGU spending pie but also the budget share of
basic social service sectors during that period.
The concomitant decline in LGU spending on
basic social services in real per capita terms
(Table 3) is a cause of concern because it has
been associated with the stagnation, if not
deterioration, in service levels of these
sectors as well as human development out-
comes (Tables 4 and 5). These trends high-
light the need to design grants that will help
ensure that LGUs are able to deliver health
and education services that are at least equal
to minimum service standards.
Recommendations
Given the above perspectives, there is a need
to reassess the tax and expenditure assign-
ment across different levels of local govern-
ment in order to provide a better match
between them. The first-best reform agenda
should involve primarily addressing vertical
Given the above perspectives, there is a need to reassess
the tax and expenditure assignment across different
levels of local government in order to provide a better
match between them. The first-best reform agenda
should involve primarily addressing vertical imbalance
through greater tax decentralization—the assignment
of more tax bases to LGUs—so as to improve
accountability at the local level.PN 2007-09
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Table 3. Real per capita MDG expenditures of LGUs (in 2000 prices), 1996–2006
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
   
Basic education 86.9 110.8 108.6 96.5 99.7 103.8 63.8 76.3 67.2 64.0 77.2
Basic health/Nutrition 121.0 140.2 134.6 134.1 148.5 134.0 121.3 126.0 120.1 111.6 105.6
Social welfare and development  31.8 36.5 35.7 35.6 41.8 42.7 37.1 42.3 38.3 36.5 37.6
Water and sanitation 4.4 5.0 4.3 4.7 4.3 4.9 3.7 3.9 3.8 3.6 4.0
  
Basic Social Services 244.0 292.6 283.2 270.9 294.3 285.3 226.0 248.5 229.5 215.7 224.3
  
Roads and bridges 215.4 245.3 205.5 226.3 246.4 223.6 183.7 192.2 182.8 166.8 190.4
Livelihood 3.1 1.7 1.2 3.7 1.6 2.5 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.5 1.7
Land redistribution 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
  
MDG Expenditures 462.5 539.6 490.0 501.0 542.3 511.4 411.2 442.3 414.0 384.0 416.3
  
Memo Item: 
Total education 109.4 135.3 137.7 121.3 131.2 132.1 88.7 109.1 94.9 90.7 109.7
Total health and nutrition 180.4 204.5 202.9 199.2 206.9 200.2 173.8 188.9 179.5 163.7 156.9
Total social services 392.8 450.5 444.9 428.3 456.9 464.1 368.4 423.6 384.7 360.3 349.6
Table 4. Selected education indicators, 1990–2005
1990 1996 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
 
Elementary level participation rate 84.6 85.2 92.7 90.3 88.7 87.1 84.4 75.6
Secondary level participation rate 54.7 56.8 62.3 59.0 60.2 60.0 58.5 45.0
Elementary level cohort survival rate 69.7 68.7 69.3 72.4 71.8 71.3 70.0 64.3
Secondary level cohort survival rate 76.4 71.4 71.0 76.8 71.7 72.4 61.0 60.1
Elementary level achievement scorea 40.1b 44.5 51.4 58.7 54.7 59.9
Secondary level achievement scorea 35.6b 42.6 51.9 44.4 46.8 44.3 46.6
          
a based on NEAT and NSAT for 1994–2000 and on NAT for 2003–2006
b refers to 1994
imbalance through greater
tax decentralization—the
assignment of more tax bases
to LGUs—so as to improve
accountability at the local
level. Subsequently, intergov-
ernmental transfers would
then have to be redesigned
to help close the disparities
in the fiscal capacities of
LGUs.
However, it should be emphasized that a
redesign of the IRA distribution formula with
the aggregate IRA share fixed at current level
is not going to be easy. First, such modifica-
tions involve a zero-sum game where some
LGUs will be winners while others will be
losers. Second, there is understandably
reluctance on the part of the central govern-
ment fiscal managers to even consider moves
in this direction because of the expected
pressure from LGUs to increase the aggregate
IRA share.
In view of these, there may be a need to
consider a second-best reform option. This
will involve the design of matching grant
programs that will help ensure that LGUs getPN 2007-09
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the appropriate financing for them to achieve
minimum service standards for key basic
social services.
The rationale for such a grant program and/or
the establishment of minimum service stan-
dards stems from the fact that some services
like basic health and environmental protec-
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Table 5. Selected health indicators, 1999–2006*
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
   
% of pregnant women with 3 or more prenatal visits 65.6 64.8 62.9 60.5 64.3 64.7 62.3 61.5
% of pregnant women given tetanus toxoid vaccination
at least twice  59.4 62.5 54.2 54.3 59.6 60.0 58.8 59.1
% of lactating mothers given Vitamin A 54.6 57.0 55.3 52.9 61.6 53.2 54.7 59.3
% of livebirths attended by medical professional,
including trained hilot 95.0 95.4 96.0 93.4 95.2 95.6 96.3 96.3
% of fully immunized children under 1 87.9 86.5 81.7 76.7 83.7 84.8 83.7 82.9
% of infants given 3rd dose of Hepa B 45.2 6.2 41.9 38.5 45.2 45.6 42.9 72.9
% of diarhhea cases among children under 5
given ORS 25.9 24.1 22.4 17.7 17.8 15.5 14.2 14.0
% of pneumonia cases among children under 5
given treatment 94.5 93.9 94.2 94.7 97.3 99.9 95.3 96.0
% of children under 1 given Vitamin A 74.0 76.9 74.6 74.7 89.8 79.2 80.0 81.0
% of children between 1 and 5 given Vitamin A 84.1 101.3 95.1 94.1 106.1 111.1 97.8 95.7
TB morbidity ratea b 203.9 174.1 149.9 154.1 120.3 133.3 137.1 169.9
Malaria morbidity ratea 91.8 66.6 39.1 50.3 36.5 24.9 43.3 27.6
* data shown for entire Philippines but data by province and city also available
a per 100,000 population
b respiratory plus other forms of TB
Source: Field Health Service Information System, various years
tion generate externalities (i.e., benefits
spillover beyond the boundaries of the local
jurisdiction) or are services which are consid-
ered meritorious and in which the central
government has a strong interest to achieve
an overriding national level outcome (e.g.,
merit goods). National standards can be
enforced in several ways, e.g., by enticing
local governments to spend more on the
specified service with a matching grant
program (McLure and Martinez-Vazquez 2002).
Alternatively, the problem could also be
addressed by designing equalization transfers
aimed at providing sufficient resources to
enable all local governments to provide a
basic package of local services (Bird and
Smart 2001). 